Reshaping international oil companies’ response mechanism to deal with the spectre of resource nationalism by Jasimuddin, Sajjad & Maniruzzaman, Munir
  
 
Reshaping  International Oil Companies’ Response Mechanism to 
Deal with the Spectre of Resource Nationalism 
 
By  
 
Dr Sajjad Jasimuddin 
School of Management and Business, Aberystwyth University, U.K.  
 
Professor A F M Maniruzzaman 
School of Law, University of Portsmouth, U.K. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Resource nationalism is building momentum across the oil-rich countries. A 
resource nationalism is a policy that emerged in the 20th century, the era of oil and 
decolonization (Sarsenbayev, 2011). However, the recent wave of resource 
nationalism has led to a renewed discussion among researchers, policy makers, and 
various stakeholders. The oil-rich nations’ governments are consolidating ownership 
over strategically important oil resources (Kretzschmar et al., 2010). A recent Ernst 
and Young (2011) report has flagged the increasing spectre of resource nationalism as 
the number-one risk facing mining industries.  
Resource nationalism is initiated by an oil-rich nation to guarantee more 
equitable sharing of the profits of the petroleum sector. Several researchers (e.g., 
Stanislaw, 2008; Click and Weiner, 2010) contend that resource nationalism broadly 
refers to state control or dominance of energy resources, and the resultant potential to 
use this power for political and economic purposes, including relationships with 
IOCs. Due to resource nationalism, today's largest IOCs, led by ExxonMobil, 
Chevron, BP and Royal Dutch Shell, produce just 10% of the world's oil and gas and 
hold about 3% of its reserves (Bremmer, 2008). Resource nationalism has witnessed 
itself in different forms and shapes, ranging from imposing windfall profit taxes – as 
has been the case in the UK- to expropriating OICs – as has been the case of Conoco-
Phillips and ExxonMobil in Venezuela.  
The many and varied reasons for the resource nationalism - the continuing 
high prices for crude oil, robust demand, the increasing bargaining power of national 
oil companies (NOCs), the nationalist forces in the host governments - have triggered 
policy responses in the oil-endowed countries. Many reasons for resource nationalism 
are as follows. 
• The key factor that drives resource nationalism in the oil industry is 
exorbitantly high oil prices. The oil-rich nations have increased tax so 
as to seek a larger share of the profits of the oil price boom. Since 
2002, the price of a barrel of oil on the world market has increased 
from a low of $17.10 per barrel to a record $146 per barrel in July 
2008 (Maloney, 2008).  
• Resource nationalism is associated with ‘obsolescing bargain’ 
(Stevens, 2008; Maniruzzaman, 2009). The bargaining power shifts 
from IOCs to the oil rich nation after most investment costs have been 
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sunk and a development phase is about to complete. At this stage, the 
host government tries to increase its fiscal take by pushing to change 
the terms of the original contract. 
• Hostile political climate in many oil exporting states is also identified 
as reason for increased resource nationalism trend (Vivoda, 2009). As 
a result, there is a rise in the concept of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over 
natural resources (Ward, 2009). Resonating with this, Click and 
Weiner (2010) state that at the heart of resource nationalism a 
government intervenes in its country’s oil resources to protect or 
enhance its national sovereignty.  
• The demand for oil is skyrocketing largely because of rising 
consumption in the emerging economies (e.g., China and India), which 
have vast populations only beginning to climb the automobile ladder.   
 
Resource nationalism is also treated as a risk factor for international oil 
companies (IOCs) as it leads to disputes with host governments. Such a policy is a 
legitimate right for sovereign nations. What matters is how resource nationalism is 
applied - which has emerged as a major challenge to international oil companies 
(IOCs). The wave of resource nationalism leads to various disputes between the oil 
rich countries and IOCs.   The IOCs have to effectively address the serious issues 
caused by the resurgence in resource nationalism. The following section will discuss 
the way in which the major IOCs should shape themselves in order to tackle the 
resource nationalism challenge.  
  
 
2. Measures to responds to the resource nationalism 
 
The rule of law to protect the interest of IOCs appears to be an evolving one 
which is often associated with changing geo-political environment. The IOCs could 
threaten legal actions against the governments. That is, many IOCs may be tempted to 
resist state intervention as done by Conoco-Phillips and ExxonMobil. However, the 
rule of law cannot always be a perfect protective shield in a crisis situation.  Since 
resource nationalism policy seems to stay in resource-rich countries, IOCs have no 
choice but to accept the sovereign right of resource-endowed countries to establish a 
stronger participation in the oil industries. In this current geo-political contexts, the 
IOCs need to act with respect, and show an understanding of historical, cultural and 
political dynamics of a host country. In stressing the importance of managing the risks 
of resource nationalism, IOCs should come up with robust responsible and sustainable 
programs to reduce perceived injustices over profit sharing. IOCs should give special 
attention to the following measures.  
 
Allowing host government participation in the stake. The IOCs’ equity 
participation in the oil project with the host government is worth considering for the 
purpose of avoiding the risk of resource nationalism (Stevens, 2009). In the wave of 
resource nationalism, the host country’s ownership in such project could prove to be a 
shield against the unilateral action by the host government, lest the project should be 
unprofitable and the action potentially dangerous for the project (Maniruzzaman, 
2009). Due to its participation in the equity, the oil rich nation will have some interest 
in the stake and thereby tries to guard it by all means.  
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Engaging in social activities. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a 
business opportunity rather than a business cost (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The IOCs 
have corporate responsibility to deliver to the society where they operate. IOCs’ 
meaningful engagement with the host society may provide an opportunity to develop 
much needed mutual trust and long-term co-operation between them (Sachs, 2007). 
Broadly speaking, IOCs have duties for climate change, sustainable development, and 
socially responsible investment (Blindheim, 2008). They need to consider social, 
health and human rights issues. The OICs should be willing to embrace in line with its 
wider CSR initiatives through its contribution to local healthcare, education, and 
employment. This may, in practice, also mitigate the risk. These aspects could be 
factored into the IOC’s CSR programme, which could, in turn, be used to avoid risk 
and dispute (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005, p. 113).   
CSR is now the reality that IOCs are facing. Hence CSR must be handled 
professionally. From the pragmatic point of view, if business needs to gain any 
reputation and make any impression on society for their long-term interest, business 
needs to engage meaningfully with society, which is more than just show-case 
philanthropy, public relations and glossy CSR reporting (Maniruzzaman, 2009).  It is 
more important than ever for the OICs to become much more mindful of the 
importance of good public relations. They should communicate effectively to the local 
community about the contributions they are making and the benefits the investment is 
bringing to the host state. In the long run, companies can benefit from community 
engagement and investment.  
 
Ensuring good practice of corporate governance. The practice of corporate 
governance can ensure the protection of the interests of the concerned stakeholders 
(i.e., the host government, the shareholders, the host community, NGOs, etc.). At the 
same time, it may be a boon for the security of IOCs’ investment. Parallel to this, 
Wells and Ahmed (2007) argue that ultimate security for IOCs lies in how a particular 
oil project is perceived by its host government, the local press, labor union, and 
nongovernmental organizations. Many of the misunderstandings between IOCs and 
their stakeholders arise due to the lack of transparency process in terms of the IOCs’ 
operations in the host country. Various forms of transparency have often been 
suggested by scholars (e.g., Maniruzzaman, 2009; Reid and Toffel, 2008; Sachs, 
2007). The IOCs should incorporate representatives of various stakeholders in the 
project-planning, decision-making and negotiating processes (Maniruzzaman, 2009). 
In this regard, Sachs (2007) suggests that all contractual terms and all payments 
between host country and the IOCs should be fully disclosed. The good practice of 
corporate governance will help to enhance fair dealings between IOCs and corporate 
stakeholders. In an age of rising shareholder activism and engagement fuelled by the 
global financial crises, corporate governance can prevent disputes among various 
stakeholders (Richardson, 2008; Reid and Toffel, 2008). 
Maintaining good relation with host government. It is not surprising that 
many IOCs are now-a-days making an effort to engage meaningfully with the host 
government in different degrees for a better relationship for their future prospect 
(Zahraa and Shehu, 2006). They should be more sensitive in their approach to dealing 
with such governments. After extensive negotiations with governments, IOCs could 
reach an agreement/ a compromise. There has been cyclical change in the relative 
balance of power between host states and their NOCs and major IOCs (Stevens, 
2008). The IOCs should not upset host governments in getting preferential treatment 
from the resource-rich nations. If they continue to cooperate with the host 
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governments in social works, there is possibility that the major IOCs will secure 
favourable deals in future. Where good relations have been fostered with host 
governments, this will help IOCs to get preferential treatment and greater scope for 
negotiation of the terms of any new requirements affecting their investment from the 
oil-rich nations.  
In some cases, it may be advisable to IOCs to accept revised terms if this helps 
sustain relationships of the host governments, which hopefully should protect their 
investments. IOCs should be aware of the importance of continuous engagement 
between host government and them as a protection measure. They would do more to 
preserve their long term interests by engaging with governments. Otherwise, IOCs 
will risk of jeopardizing their future growth if they fail to work with oil-rich 
governments towards their mutual best interests.   
 
  Forming strategic alliances with research based universities. Resource 
nationalism has come to stay in resource-rich countries. The debate over resource 
nationalism severely limits areas open to IOC investment and has had negative effects 
on their operations. So the IOCs should find other alternative energy rather than 
focusing exclusively on fossil fuels. For example, British Petroleum abbreviates its 
name to BP and announces that it stands for “beyond petroleum”. The IOCs should 
make significant investment in research and development (R&D) so as to come up 
with alternative and renewable fuels. With this aim in mind, they need to form 
strategic alliances with research based universities. In the meantime, British 
Petroleum has spent $8 billion for R&D in alternative and renewable fuels and agreed 
to spend half a billion dollars to create the Energy Biosciences Institute at University 
of California Berkeley to study biofuels. Similarly, Chevron, meanwhile, recently 
formed an alliance with a Silicon Valley startup to produce fuel from algae (Buchanan 
and Anwar, 2009). 
 
 Administering research for early detection of grievances.  In the case of oil 
projects there should be mechanisms in place that would work like radar for early 
detection of grievances and also prevention mechanisms. In this respect, IOCs need to 
be proactive and understand the cultural milieu in which they operate (Maniruzzaman, 
2009). Every dispute has a gestation period to evolve, or there may be an abrupt 
outbreak. Whatever is the nature of grievances or disputes, the IOCs can administer 
regular survey with the help of local NGOs to identify grievances or disputes of other 
stakeholders. The possible results of the survey could act as early detection 
mechanism so that the IOCs can determine what to do in the situation. The approach 
would be thus to take action in the circumstances as the well-prepared and to take 
decision as the well- informed. Efforts must be made to resolve any problem amicably 
between the parties involved before it escalates into a dispute.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The oil-rich countries treat IOCs as their prime target to control the oil 
resources. The IOCs have been unsuccessful in bargaining with their major actors, 
such oil-rich countries, oil-importing countries, and NOCs. There is no sign that 
resource nationalism will go away. The tools mentioned could contribute to the 
dispute avoidance, and help the parties continue their relationship. It is time to 
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reshape the IOC’s behaviour and activities in the wave of resource nationalism for 
their survival.  However, the paper ignores other resources such mining and other 
mineral resources in its discussion. Furthermore, it did not take into account host 
governments’ perspective in resource nationalism. Future research may incorporate 
other sectors of resources industry from various stakeholders’ (e.g., government) 
perspective to get a holistic picture of the cause and effect of resource nationalism.  
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